2018
Hess, Ursula; Landmann, Helen; David, Shlomo; Hareli, Shlomo
In: Cognition and Emotion, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 1152–1165, 2018.
Abstract | Links | Tags: awe, context, Emotion, moral decisions
@article{hess2018bidirectional,
title = {The bidirectional relation of emotion perception and social judgments: the effect of witness’ emotion expression on perceptions of moral behaviour and vice versa},
author = {Ursula Hess and Helen Landmann and Shlomo David and Shlomo Hareli},
doi = {10.1080/02699931.2017.1388769},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
journal = {Cognition and Emotion},
volume = {32},
number = {6},
pages = {1152--1165},
publisher = {Taylor & Francis},
abstract = {The present research tested the notion that emotion expression and context perception are bidirectionally related. Specifically, in two studies focusing on moral violations (N = 288) and positive moral deviations (N = 245) respectively, we presented participants with short vignettes describing behaviours that were either (im)moral, (in)polite or unusual together with a picture of the emotional reaction of a person who supposedly had been a witness to the event. Participants rated both the emotional reactions observed and their own moral appraisal of the situation described. In both studies, we found that situational context influenced how emotional reactions to this context were rated and in turn, the emotional expression shown in reaction to a situation influenced the appraisal of the situation. That is, neither the moral events nor the emotion expressions were judged in an absolute fashion. Rather, the perception of one also depended on the other.},
keywords = {awe, context, Emotion, moral decisions},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The present research tested the notion that emotion expression and context perception are bidirectionally related. Specifically, in two studies focusing on moral violations (N = 288) and positive moral deviations (N = 245) respectively, we presented participants with short vignettes describing behaviours that were either (im)moral, (in)polite or unusual together with a picture of the emotional reaction of a person who supposedly had been a witness to the event. Participants rated both the emotional reactions observed and their own moral appraisal of the situation described. In both studies, we found that situational context influenced how emotional reactions to this context were rated and in turn, the emotional expression shown in reaction to a situation influenced the appraisal of the situation. That is, neither the moral events nor the emotion expressions were judged in an absolute fashion. Rather, the perception of one also depended on the other.
Landmann, Helen; Hess, Ursula
Testing moral foundation theory: Are specific moral emotions elicited by specific moral transgressions? Journal Article
In: Journal of Moral Education, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 34–47, 2018.
Abstract | Links | Tags: Emotion, moral decisions
@article{landmann2018testing,
title = {Testing moral foundation theory: Are specific moral emotions elicited by specific moral transgressions?},
author = {Helen Landmann and Ursula Hess},
doi = {10.1080/03057240.2017.1350569},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Moral Education},
volume = {47},
number = {1},
pages = {34--47},
publisher = {Taylor & Francis},
abstract = {Moral foundation theory posits that specific moral transgressions elicit specific moral emotions. To test this claim, participants (N = 195) were asked to rate their emotions in response to moral violation vignettes. We found that compassion and disgust were associated with care and purity respectively as predicted by moral foundation theory. However, anger, rage, contempt, resentment and fear were not associated to any single moral transgression. Thus, even though the type of moral violation matters for the type of emotion that is elicited, the link between moral foundations and moral emotions seems more complex than moral foundation theory suggests. Rather, the findings suggest that there are both emotion-specific foundations (i.e. care and purity) and emotion-unspecific foundations (i.e. fairness, authority and loyalty).},
keywords = {Emotion, moral decisions},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Moral foundation theory posits that specific moral transgressions elicit specific moral emotions. To test this claim, participants (N = 195) were asked to rate their emotions in response to moral violation vignettes. We found that compassion and disgust were associated with care and purity respectively as predicted by moral foundation theory. However, anger, rage, contempt, resentment and fear were not associated to any single moral transgression. Thus, even though the type of moral violation matters for the type of emotion that is elicited, the link between moral foundations and moral emotions seems more complex than moral foundation theory suggests. Rather, the findings suggest that there are both emotion-specific foundations (i.e. care and purity) and emotion-unspecific foundations (i.e. fairness, authority and loyalty).