2018
Landmann, Helen; Hess, Ursula
Testing moral foundation theory: Are specific moral emotions elicited by specific moral transgressions? Journal Article
In: Journal of Moral Education, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 34–47, 2018.
Abstract | Links | Tags: anger, compassion, contempt, disgust, Emotion, moral decisions, Moral foundation theory
@article{landmann2018testing,
title = {Testing moral foundation theory: Are specific moral emotions elicited by specific moral transgressions?},
author = {Helen Landmann and Ursula Hess},
doi = {10.1080/03057240.2017.1350569},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Moral Education},
volume = {47},
number = {1},
pages = {34--47},
publisher = {Taylor & Francis},
abstract = {Moral foundation theory posits that specific moral transgressions elicit specific moral emotions. To test this claim, participants (N = 195) were asked to rate their emotions in response to moral violation vignettes. We found that compassion and disgust were associated with care and purity respectively as predicted by moral foundation theory. However, anger, rage, contempt, resentment and fear were not associated to any single moral transgression. Thus, even though the type of moral violation matters for the type of emotion that is elicited, the link between moral foundations and moral emotions seems more complex than moral foundation theory suggests. Rather, the findings suggest that there are both emotion-specific foundations (i.e. care and purity) and emotion-unspecific foundations (i.e. fairness, authority and loyalty).},
keywords = {anger, compassion, contempt, disgust, Emotion, moral decisions, Moral foundation theory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Moral foundation theory posits that specific moral transgressions elicit specific moral emotions. To test this claim, participants (N = 195) were asked to rate their emotions in response to moral violation vignettes. We found that compassion and disgust were associated with care and purity respectively as predicted by moral foundation theory. However, anger, rage, contempt, resentment and fear were not associated to any single moral transgression. Thus, even though the type of moral violation matters for the type of emotion that is elicited, the link between moral foundations and moral emotions seems more complex than moral foundation theory suggests. Rather, the findings suggest that there are both emotion-specific foundations (i.e. care and purity) and emotion-unspecific foundations (i.e. fairness, authority and loyalty).
2017
Landmann, Helen; Hess, Ursula
What elicits third-party anger? The effects of moral violation and others’ outcome on anger and compassion Journal Article
In: Cognition and Emotion, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 1097–1111, 2017.
Abstract | Links | Tags: anger, appraisal theory, compassion, cooperation, Economic Decisions, Emotion, Punishment
@article{landmann2017elicitsb,
title = {What elicits third-party anger? The effects of moral violation and others’ outcome on anger and compassion},
author = {Helen Landmann and Ursula Hess},
doi = {10.1080/02699931.2016.1194258},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-06-01},
urldate = {2017-06-01},
journal = {Cognition and Emotion},
volume = {31},
number = {6},
pages = {1097--1111},
publisher = {Taylor & Francis},
abstract = {People often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves. In two studies, we investigated the elicitation of third-party anger by varying moral violation and others’ outcome presented in newspaper articles. We found that anger was highly contingent on the moral violation. Others’ outcome, although relevant for compassion, were not significantly relevant for anger (Study 1 and Study 2a) or less relevant for anger than for compassion (Study 2b). This indicates that people can be morally outraged: anger can be elicited by a perceived violation of moral values alone, independent of the harm done. A severe negative consequence for others is not necessary to elicit anger.},
keywords = {anger, appraisal theory, compassion, cooperation, Economic Decisions, Emotion, Punishment},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
People often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves. In two studies, we investigated the elicitation of third-party anger by varying moral violation and others’ outcome presented in newspaper articles. We found that anger was highly contingent on the moral violation. Others’ outcome, although relevant for compassion, were not significantly relevant for anger (Study 1 and Study 2a) or less relevant for anger than for compassion (Study 2b). This indicates that people can be morally outraged: anger can be elicited by a perceived violation of moral values alone, independent of the harm done. A severe negative consequence for others is not necessary to elicit anger.