2020
Landmann, Helen; Rohmann, Anette
In: Journal of Environmental Psychology, vol. 71, pp. 101491, 2020.
Abstract | Links | Tags: anger, being moved, collective action, Emotion, pro-environmental behavior, Punishment
@article{landmann2020being,
title = {Being moved by protest: Collective efficacy beliefs and injustice appraisals enhance collective action intentions for forest protection via positive and negative emotions},
author = {Helen Landmann and Anette Rohmann},
doi = {10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101491},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-12-02},
urldate = {2020-12-02},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Psychology},
volume = {71},
pages = {101491},
publisher = {Elsevier},
abstract = {Based on collective action theories and appraisal theories of emotion, we propose that people are moved and positively overwhelmed by the idea that together they can make a difference for a more sustainable future and that these feelings motivate them to participate in pro-environmental collective action. We surveyed activists and sympathizers of a forest protection campaign (Study 1, N = 210) and conducted an experiment (Study 2, N = 221) to test this claim. As expected, feelings of being moved mediated the effect of collective efficacy beliefs on collective action intentions in both studies. Hence, being moved constitutes a second emotional path to collective action alongside group-based anger. These two emotional paths differently elicited the goal to punish authorities (intergroup goal), to be part of the movement (intragroup goal), and to reduce climate change (ideological goal). The findings suggest that negative and positive emotions (anger and being moved) amplify already existing motivations.},
keywords = {anger, being moved, collective action, Emotion, pro-environmental behavior, Punishment},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Based on collective action theories and appraisal theories of emotion, we propose that people are moved and positively overwhelmed by the idea that together they can make a difference for a more sustainable future and that these feelings motivate them to participate in pro-environmental collective action. We surveyed activists and sympathizers of a forest protection campaign (Study 1, N = 210) and conducted an experiment (Study 2, N = 221) to test this claim. As expected, feelings of being moved mediated the effect of collective efficacy beliefs on collective action intentions in both studies. Hence, being moved constitutes a second emotional path to collective action alongside group-based anger. These two emotional paths differently elicited the goal to punish authorities (intergroup goal), to be part of the movement (intragroup goal), and to reduce climate change (ideological goal). The findings suggest that negative and positive emotions (anger and being moved) amplify already existing motivations.
2017
Landmann, Helen; Hess, Ursula
What elicits third-party anger? The effects of moral violation and others’ outcome on anger and compassion Journal Article
In: Cognition and Emotion, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 1097–1111, 2017.
Abstract | Links | Tags: anger, appraisal theory, compassion, cooperation, Economic Decisions, Emotion, Punishment
@article{landmann2017elicitsb,
title = {What elicits third-party anger? The effects of moral violation and others’ outcome on anger and compassion},
author = {Helen Landmann and Ursula Hess},
doi = {10.1080/02699931.2016.1194258},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-06-01},
urldate = {2017-06-01},
journal = {Cognition and Emotion},
volume = {31},
number = {6},
pages = {1097--1111},
publisher = {Taylor & Francis},
abstract = {People often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves. In two studies, we investigated the elicitation of third-party anger by varying moral violation and others’ outcome presented in newspaper articles. We found that anger was highly contingent on the moral violation. Others’ outcome, although relevant for compassion, were not significantly relevant for anger (Study 1 and Study 2a) or less relevant for anger than for compassion (Study 2b). This indicates that people can be morally outraged: anger can be elicited by a perceived violation of moral values alone, independent of the harm done. A severe negative consequence for others is not necessary to elicit anger.},
keywords = {anger, appraisal theory, compassion, cooperation, Economic Decisions, Emotion, Punishment},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
People often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves. In two studies, we investigated the elicitation of third-party anger by varying moral violation and others’ outcome presented in newspaper articles. We found that anger was highly contingent on the moral violation. Others’ outcome, although relevant for compassion, were not significantly relevant for anger (Study 1 and Study 2a) or less relevant for anger than for compassion (Study 2b). This indicates that people can be morally outraged: anger can be elicited by a perceived violation of moral values alone, independent of the harm done. A severe negative consequence for others is not necessary to elicit anger.